Internal review establishes that a system behaves as its authors intended. It cannot establish that the authors' intent was itself sound, because the same assumptions produced both. SwssChain therefore subjects its protocol implementation and its first-party contracts to assurance performed by parties who did not build them.
Principles of the Assurance Programme
| Principle | What it commits SWSS to |
| More than one reviewer | Components that bind settlement receive review from more than one independent party. Two firms share fewer blind spots than one, and the second engagement exists to find what the first could not see |
| Findings published in full | Reports are published complete, including findings of every severity. Redaction is limited to material that would function as an exploit guide for a system not yet remediated |
| Remediation verified by the finder | High and Critical findings are re-examined by the party that raised them after remediation, to confirm the fix is effective and introduces nothing new. A fix asserted by the team that wrote it is not a closed finding |
| Assurance is continuous | An audit is a statement about a version, not about a system. Material change to an audited component triggers further review scoped to what changed |
| Formal proof where testing cannot reach | Consensus rules and certificate verification are formally verified. Testing demonstrates behaviour on the inputs tried; proof establishes behaviour on every input possible |
Publication
A completed report is published once the remediation it describes has been confirmed, together with the formal verification outputs produced alongside it. Publishing a finding before its fix is deployed would convert an assurance document into an attack description, which is why publication follows remediation rather than completion.
The Boundary of This Programme
Assurance covers first-party SWSS components: the consensus client, the Settlement Consensus Protocol implementation, and the contracts through which SwssChain settles. It does not extend to contracts deployed by other parties, and no assurance stated here should be read as covering them. Institutions building significant systems on SwssChain are expected to commission their own review, and this is a condition of admission rather than a suggestion: see Developer Obligations.
Weaknesses found outside a formal engagement are handled through the disclosure programme in Reporting Vulnerabilities.