This documentation is restricted to authorised members of the SWSS Developer Community. Access is granted exclusively through SWSS DevHub, after KYB and SWSS Foundation approval.
All SwssChain GitHub repositories are private. Significant updates are currently deploying across the full SWSS Ecosystem. SDK and API specifications are subject to change at any time in accordance with security requirements and SwssChain Foundation governance decisions.
SWSS SDK v2.1 is deploying across the ecosystem. API signatures may change during this period. Ensure your integration uses the latest schema from SWSS DevHub.
A settlement network's cryptography is the part of it that cannot be corrected later. A protocol flaw can be governed away and an operational weakness can be remediated, but a settlement authorised under a broken primitive stays authorised. SwssChain therefore makes two separate decisions about cryptography, and makes them in opposite directions.
SWSS does not design primitives. SWSS designs everything above them.
The Primitives SwssChain Settles On
| Primitive | What it secures on SwssChain |
|---|---|
| Keccak-256 | Hashing throughout the execution layer: addresses, transaction and block hashes, contract storage. The EVM-standard construction, which is what allows Ethereum-compatible tooling to verify SwssChain data without modification |
| secp256k1 (ECDSA) | Account-level authorisation. Every transaction is signed by the account that submits it, verifiable by any party holding the public key |
| BLS signature aggregation | Finality attestation. Validator signatures over a Finality Certificate combine into a single aggregate signature whose size does not grow with the number of validators that produced it. See BFTFA: Byzantine Fault Tolerant Finality Attestation |
| Groth16 zero-knowledge proofs | Settlement privacy. A record's validity is proved without the record being published, which is what allows a commercially sensitive settlement to be verified by a party not entitled to read it. See SCP-ZK: Zero-Knowledge Settlement Privacy |
| Proof-system hashing | Hashing inside proof circuits, where the cost of a conventional hash function would dominate proving time |
Why the Primitives Are Not SWSS's Own
This is a deliberate position rather than an absence of ambition, and it is worth stating plainly because the opposite claim is frequently marketed as a strength.
The security of a cryptographic primitive is not a property of its design. It is a property of how long the world has tried to break it in public and failed. Keccak-256 and the discrete-log assumptions underneath BLS and Groth16 have absorbed sustained, adversarial, published cryptanalysis for years by people whose careers advance if they succeed. A primitive designed privately has no such record, and the absence cannot be compensated for by care.
An institution assessing SwssChain can therefore evaluate the base layer against public literature rather than against assurances from SWSS. That is the point. A settlement network asking a counterparty to trust an unexamined cipher is asking for something it has no way to earn.
What SWSS Builds Above Them
The layer where SWSS does build its own is the layer where building your own is correct, the constructions that combine primitives into settlement behaviour. Every item below is SWSS's own design and implementation.
| Construction | What SWSS designed |
|---|---|
| Settlement Consensus Protocol | The consensus protocol itself, in four components (SAPE, DSA, PCA and BFTFA) rather than an adaptation of an existing consensus design |
| SCP-ZK | The zero-knowledge settlement privacy layer: what is proved, what remains private, and how a proof binds to a settlement record |
| Aggregation signer | The signer that produces and verifies aggregate finality signatures is SWSS's own implementation, with its own test suite, rather than a library invocation |
| DEED-1 | The settlement instrument standard: how jurisdiction, legal owner and institutional signature become fields of a settlement rather than documents beside it |
| SWSS IVL | The credential architecture, including how a verified status is carried across the ecosystem without re-verification and without re-disclosure |
| On-chain rotation | The mechanism by which a validator replaces operating material without leaving the active set |
Defence in Layers
No single mechanism stands between a settlement and a loss. The properties that protect a SwssChain settlement are produced by different mechanisms, at different layers, that fail independently, an account signature authorises, deterministic sequencing fixes order before production, aggregate attestation establishes finality, and zero-knowledge proving governs what becomes visible. A weakness in one does not compose into a weakness in the others, because the others do not depend on it for their guarantee.
This is the same principle the ecosystem applies to authority, described in SWSS Ecosystem Security: containment by structure rather than by response.
In Development
Everything above this heading is live on SwssChain today. Everything below it is under development by the SWSS Technology Team and is described here so that an integrator can plan, not so that it can be relied upon. Nothing in this section carries a guarantee until it ships.
| In development | What it adds |
|---|---|
| SWSS Security Layer: Q1 2027 | An additional SWSS-designed protection layer operating above the established protocols described on this page. It does not replace any primitive or protocol currently in use; it composes with them, so that a settlement is protected by more than one independent mechanism at each stage rather than by a single one. The design is being developed and reviewed by the SWSS Technology Team |
| Multi-party authorisation | A SWSS-designed multi-signature construction, so that authority over a high-value account is exercised by an agreed quorum rather than by any single holder. Multi-party authorisation is protocol and application design rather than primitive design, which is why it is built in-house |
| Post-quantum readiness | A reviewed migration path for signature and attestation schemes, so that the transition to post-quantum primitives is a planned protocol upgrade rather than an emergency. Settlement records already written must remain verifiable across that transition, which is the harder half of the problem |
| Extended formal verification | Widening formal proof coverage beyond finality attestation and certificate verification into further protocol-critical paths |
What is stated here is its purpose and its position in the stack. Its mechanism, its parameters and the protocols it composes with are not described, and will be published in the form the rest of this section follows: properties an institution can rely on and verify, rather than a design an adversary can study before it ships. Institutions requiring detail ahead of release should raise it through a due diligence engagement with the SWSS Foundation.
